About two weeks after D-Day, at a survivor camp in Scotland a final report that detailed how heavy enemy artillery fire had sunk the Corry was about to be submitted as the official loss of ship report for the Corry. However, following a meeting of the commanding officers of the USS Corry, USS Meredith (DD-726), and USS Glennon (DD-620), that report was suddenly discarded and a new contradictory report was written up, stating that the Corry had struck a mine. No officers or crew were consulted for input on the re-written mine report, which then became the final official loss of ship report for the Corry. From the front cover onward, the new official report stated outright that the Corry struck a mine and sank--until its very last page, where clarification was finally given and it was stated that a mine was believed to have exploded simultaneously with some kind of now unidentified artillery fire. The final official report hides the fact that heavy-caliber projectiles hit the Corry and detonated in the engineering spaces as was clearly detailed in the initial action reports. The fact that there was a strong concussion effect when the ship was hit was the sole basis for the mine hypothesis, and the multiple heavy-caliber projectiles that exploded in the exact same location and at the exact same instant as the hypothesized mine were now officially reduced to having caused "merely incidental damage" to the Corry. Anyone reading only the final official report is unaware that these heavy artillery shells that hit the Corry amidships measured 8.25-inches in diameter and weighed 300 pounds--bigger than those fired from heavy cruisers. They were fired by guns capable of shooting more than 18 miles, and they blasted the Corry virtually point-blank range. A salvo of these heavy shells does not cause "merely incidental damage" to a tin can destroyer; it causes significant, considerable damage, and produces quite a strong concussion effect. When detonating near the keel of a destroyer at very high velocity, these shells can be lethal. From mid-June 1944 onward, it is clear that in the official Allied report, enemy artillery fire was in no way going to be allowed to have contributed to or cause the sinking of the USS Corry. In any event, noting the direction men were thrown on the ship, a mine could not have exploded under the USS Corry as is reported in the final official report. 

Battle report noting changed account of the loss of the USS Corry
Post-Invasion Report "Cruiser Division Seven" 1 July 1944

THE PHYSICS OF THE EXPLOSION REFUTE A MINE EXPLOSION

To note: When the Corry was hit amidships, men were thrown toward the center of the ship. Men and equipment on the bridge were thrown backwards, consistent with heavy-caliber shells entering the engineering spaces (below the water level, aft of the bridge), and detonating downward, driving the middle of the ship downward like a "V" and pulling the bridge and everyone on it backward. However, a mine exploding under the engineering spaces as reported in the final official report would have caused the exact opposite of what happened: it would have driven the middle of the ship upward and would have thrown men and equipment on the bridge forward. Similarly, a mine exploding amidships, driving the middle of the ship upwards, would have thrown men positioned aft of the explosion area in a backwards direction, but they were thrown forward toward the center of the ship.

Additionally, one crewmember stationed aft of the explosion area -- he was outside on the upper deck of the Corry between the ship's second smokestack and Gun 3 -- explained how he was thrown upward into the air by the jolt when the ship got hit; just as he began to come down, the ship came back up and hit him. These physical movements are consistent with the middle of the ship being driven down into the water when it got hit, where the great volume of air below deck not normally below the water level would then cause the ship to launch abruptly back upward out of the water and hit the crewman while he was still in the air. A mine would not produce the effect of the ship being driven downward into the water.

Some crewmembers have stated that the Corry hit a mine largely because that is what they were told happened after the sinking. However, with first hand accounts given of the physics of the explosion, as one Corry officer explained, it is physically impossible for a mine to have exploded under the engineering spaces as stated in the final official report.  Unfortunately, the final official report is usually what is considered history.

As to why the final official report stated there was a mine two weeks after D-Day, some speculate that Allied Command may have later wanted to discredit the marksmanship of the German gunners in the invasion.

All in all, however, Corry survivors are not so much concerned with how the USS Corry was sunk. For them, the fact the USS Corry was sunk on the front lines on D-Day while blasting enemy positions in the invasion to break Adolf Hitler, is what is important.

For specific details about mine vs. gunfire, read D-Day accounts of Corry survivors Ensign Robert Beeman and Chief Petty Officer Francis "Mac" McKernon on the D-Day accounts page.

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Read about how the USS Corry and USS Meredith (DD-726) were declared sunk by mines after their initial reports were changed.

USS Corry (DD-463)                 USS Meredith (DD-726)

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Oberleutnant Walter Ohmsen, commander of the Saint Marcouf Battery, which had a garrison of 400 men. Born on June 7, 1911. Joined the German Navy in April, 1929. Prior to commanding Saint Marcouf, he was German Navy chief of instruction in telemetry at the marine artillery school of Sassnitz. Wounded during the invasion, he received the Knights Cross for his efforts in repelling the attack. He was captured in late June 1944.

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Below: The plaque at the Saint-Marcouf (Crisbecq) battery.
The third paragraph is in reference to the Corry. The Corry was hit at about 6:30 a.m., after a heated artillery duel with the battery that lasted several minutes.

SAINT-MARCOUF : THE CRISBECQ BATTERY GERMAN COASTAL DEFENSE         The only heavy battery on the eastern coast of the Cotentin Peninsula, the Crisbecq Battery, was located 2.5 kilometers from the shore on a crest overlooking all of Utah Beach. From Crisbecq, the Germans could see and defend the entire coastline from Saint-Vaast-la-Hougue to Grandcamp.         Although it was never completed, the Crisbecq battery was the keystone of this portion of the German Atlantic Wall with three, long-range 210 mm cannons and a garrison of 400 men. The Allies dropped over 800 bombs on Crisbecq between April 19 and June 6, 1944. This unrelenting aerial attack climaxed on the night of June 5 when 101 four-engine bombers unleashed 598 tons of explosives on the battery. On June 6, the surroundings were unrecognizable, but the guns were still intact.         At 6 am on D-Day, as GI’s were landing on Utah Beach, Crisbecq opened fire, sinking an American destroyer.         The battery held out for several days, despite shelling by U.S. battleships and attacks from the American Infantry in hand-to-hand trench combat.         To repel the Allied assault, the German commander of Crisbecq radioed to the Azeville battery and requested that it fire on his position. Crisbecq was finally taken at 8:20 am on June 12, after the German commandment ordered its troops to evacuate to La Pernelle, between Quettehou and Barfleur. The fierce German resistance momentarily halted the Allied Advance to the north.

MORE PHOTOS

One of Saint-Marcouf's three 210-millimeter (8.25-inch) guns
June 21, 1944
 

Two concrete-reinforced casemates of the Saint-Marcouf (Crisbecq) battery.
Fifty-foot flames spewed from the gun barrels when they fired.


View toward Utah Beach from Saint-Marcouf (Crisbecq) battery.  1944
(Houses along the beach, 1.5 miles distant from the battery.)
[National Archives photos]
 

Modern Look Saint-Marcouf (Crisbecq) Battery (2004)

With a garrison of 400 men, the Crisbecq (Saint Marcouf) battery was one of the most important on the East Contentin coast. The position contained two 210-mm (8.25 in.) guns in casemates, one 210-mm in an open emplacement, and six 88-mm dual purpose guns in open emplacements. The casemates had roofs of reinforced concrete 12-1/2 feet thick and walls ranging from 10 to 16 feet thick. One of the three 210-mm guns was destroyed on D-Day by a direct heavy-caliber hit. All the other guns in the battery which were not enclosed were eventually destroyed or nearly so. There were ample bomb-proof personnel shelters in the area which afforded complete protection to the gun crews. In 2004 the entire site was excavated.
 

Destroyed Saint-Marcouf encasement. Roof nearly 13-feet thick collapsed when engineers destroyed it after capture.	Close-up view of destroyed Saint-Marcouf battery encasement.
	Inside battery's bomb-proof personnel shelter.

  
Fragmentation scars at Saint-Marcouf battery.

[Photos: S. Voskuil, The Netherlands, 2004] 

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View Maps and Reports of Utah Beach Enemy Batteries / Targets including Saint-Marcouf / Crisbecq

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FULL USS CORRY LOSS OF SHIP REPORT AND D-DAY ACTION REPORT - Text or Images View Full Corry Loss of Ship / Action Report - Text - (Loads Quickly) View Full Corry Loss of Ship / Action Report - 13 Scanned Images

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